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Abstract 
Following the financial crisis, the EU put in place a number of instruments aimed at providing 
macro-financial support to EU member states in difficulty, five of which remain in place. At the 
request of the European Parliament, CEPS carried out an in-depth assessment of the 
functioning and institutional arrangements of these support programmes with a view to 
providing a solid basis on which to design a sound architecture that can serve Europe for 
decades to come. This paper draws a number of important lessons from this assessment and 
identifies a few crucial issues that still need to be addressed.  
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Executive Summary 
Background 
The European sovereign debt crisis, which started in 2010 as a contagion effect of the global 
financial crises, has clearly proven the need to create a financial safety net for euro-area 
countries and, more generally, to reinforce the EU mandate to safeguard the macro-financial 
stability of the Union. A number of instruments for financial assistance have been designed to 
provide support to member states in financial difficulty.  
The instruments were set up as a reaction to emergencies, and their architecture and 
governance need to be revisited and rationalised to ensure they are efficient and operate 
within a solid European legal framework.  
At the present time, the EU has five financial stabilisation mechanisms in place:  
i) Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance programme, reserved for EU member states outside 
the euro area 
ii) European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), reserved for euro-area countries  
iii) Greek Loan Facility (GLF) set up specifically for Greece 
iv) European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
v) European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The first two are an integral part of the European Union’s budget structure and use the margins 
of the budget under the maximum own resources ceiling (1.23% of GNI) of the EU budget as a 
guarantee to raise funds in the international markets.  
The last three instruments are intergovernmental, set up outside the EU budget and are thus 
outside the Treaty provisions. The multiplicity of instruments is the result of ad-hoc decisions 
taken in response to pressing needs when one instrument revealed itself to be insufficient and 
a new one had to be urgently created.  
Now is an opportune time to assess the functioning and institutional arrangements of the 
financial support programmes put in place by the EU in order to start to design a sound 
architecture that can serve Europe for decades to come. This paper draws a number of 
important lessons from this assessment and identifies a few crucial issues that still need to be 
addressed.  
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The Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) mechanisms have a combined lending capacity of €110 billion (€50 billion for BoP and 
€60 billion for the EFSM). The BoP and EFSM pose a certain risk to the EU budget, which has 
been addressed by not allowing any repayment obligation of the EU in any specific year to the 
borrowers to exceed the Own Resources ceiling. 
On the present use of the instruments, the BoP has only EUR4.22 billion outstanding in support 
for Romania and Latvia,1 but the support for Ireland and Portugal have drained much of the 
EFSM (€46.8 billion), and the long maturities means that the capacity of the EFSM is very 
limited.  
This paper pinpoints some concern over the Balance-of-payments BoP assistance and European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), namely weaknesses in the transparency and 
explanations provided on the mechanisms that would be activated in the event of a default. It 
is taken for granted that existing budgetary procedures would suffice to cover any amounts, 
but the EU budget resources structure raises some controversial questions for which the 
background research has not found convincing answers. For example, in case of a default: 
Would corrections apply to the amount that member states are required to cover? Would the 
defaulting member state contribute to its own default and how would the contribution be 
treated? The political realities on financing the budget and the potential institutional challenges 
are not completely benign. The UK’s questioning of its obligations to support eurozone member 
states when a bridge loan for Greece was given through the EFSM, are a demonstration of the 
political sensitivities behind the technical budgetary set-up. 
The Greek Loan Facility (GLF), the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which are 
designed to support member states of the euro area, have combined outstanding loans to 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain worth €359 billion. With the exception of the EFSM, 
these instruments fall outside the scrutiny of the European Parliament and are 
intergovernmental in nature.  
Three of the existing facilities – the GLF, EFSF and EFSM – seem to be headed towards a slow 
winding-down process, and their tasks are progressively being taken aboard by the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Moreover, given that in the long term all EU Member States will 
adopt the euro as their currency, the Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance is also destined to 
disappear. This implies that, in the long term, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would 
remain the only macro-financial stability (MFS) instrument.  
The ESM will, therefore, at some point, have to be integrated into the EU legal framework, but 
there has been no thinking yet about how this will be done, and about its linkages, if any, with 
the EU budget. Nor has much thought been given to how to ensure democratic control of its 
                                                     
1 As of 1 December 2016: Latvia EUR0.7 bn and Romania EUR3.5 bn.   
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operations and the possible prejudice played by budgetary sovereignty of national Parliaments 
in this process. 
These are complex questions that require more in-depth analysis than can be carried out in the 
present exercise. At this stage, this paper presents two extreme options that can be considered 
as a starting point.  
ESM Reform – Option One. A first option would be to integrate the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) into the EU’s legal framework by adding it to the EU budget. Such a politically 
sensitive move would require a very large increase in the ceiling of the EU budget. It would also 
raise a large number of institutional questions. Macro-financial assistance is very different from 
the normal operations of the EU budget. Already some of the issues regarding the suitability of 
the EU budget mechanisms (such as the way in which resources are raised), make the EU 
budget set-up not ideal. Mimicking the structure of the existing European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) would mean a radical transformation of the current ESM and most likely a 
radical overhaul of the way in which the EU budget operates at least for the assistance 
guaranteed in its margins. We also raise a warning note here concerning the proposal to create 
a eurozone budget: it would not offer a good solution, as a eurozone budget would serve the 
function of providing macroeconomic stabilisation, while the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) offers macro-financial stability. These functions also do not fit well together in terms of 
their respective governance requirements.  
ESM Reform – Option Two. We propose a second option, namely that the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) would continue to be a new stand-alone and independent EU institution, 
with its own staff and democratic accountability mechanism, but it would be accountable to 
the European Parliament for the overall functioning of the mechanism. This would imply that 
ESM is not only in charge of providing financial assistance but it is also responsible for the 
design, negotiation and monitoring of the adjustment programme, which defines the 
conditionality, for the disbursement.  
For the ’transition’ period during which the ESM would become the only MFS instrument will 
be a long one. We recommend retaining the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) in the meantime, but also re-establishing its lending capacity by transferring its existing 
outstanding loans to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The risk assumed under EFSM 
lending should only fall on euro area member states. The EFSM could be used to help smaller 
member of the eurozone. Given that there are over 15 member states with a GDP below €300 
billion, the EFSM offers a credible financial backing for those, it cannot be excluded that at 
some point in the future only a limited amount might be needed. Seen from this perspective, 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) could then turn out to be an important 
instrument to be used under the normal Community decisions mechanisms and under the 
scrutiny of the European Parliament.  
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1. Introduction 
The sovereign debt crisis, which started in 2010 as a contagion effect of the Global Financial 
crises caused by the subprime mortgage market crash in the United States, has clearly proven 
the need to create a financial safety net for euro area countries and, more generally, to 
reinforce the EU mandate to safeguard the macro-financial stability of the Union.  
In just a few recent years, the architecture of the economic governance within the EU has 
evolved substantially: there are more shared rules, commitments and coordination, thanks to 
the Euro Plus Pact, the Six and the Two Packs reforming the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
and, overall, the introduction and development of the European Semester. 
It was evident, however, that to ensure the macro-financial stability across the EU, and 
especially within the euro area, common rules alone were not sufficient, and new instruments 
for financial assistance have been designed to provide support to member states in financial 
difficulty.  
On the eve of its 60th anniversary, it is worth recalling that the Treaty of Rome already 
countenanced the possibility of the Council granting ‘mutual assistance’ to member states 
facing a balance-of-payments crisis.2 At that time, however, the first pre-condition of making 
such assistance available was “a concerted approach to or within an international 
organization”.3 In fact, when the ‘Common Market’ was formed 60 years ago, monetary policy 
was assumed to be a national competence and exchange rates were fixed under the Bretton 
Woods system of the dollar-gold standard. But when the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 
the 1970s, exchange rate movements became an important issue for the functioning of the EU. 
International financial issues, however, such as exchange rates, were still coordinated mainly 
through global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the 
establishment of EMU (Economic and Monetary Union), the evolving role of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the involvement of the EU institutions in the management of the crisis 
in the EU periphery, the role played by the Union in the financial stability of European 
economies was significantly strengthened.  
Nevertheless, the economic governance framework at EU level and the coordination of 
economic and budgetary policies among member states have proven to be ineffective in 
addressing the impact of shocks and the risks of financial contagion. Additional instruments to 
support macro-financial stability have been created out of the common EU governance and law 
framework. The urgency brought on by the sovereign debt crisis has certainly made it more 
difficult to find the political support necessary to produce a more integrated and institutional 
response.  
Through bonds issued on international capital markets, the European Commission runs three 
loan programmes that provide financial assistance to member states experiencing financial 
                                                     
2 Art.108 of the Treaty of Rome, paragraph 1. 
3 Art.108 of the Treaty of Rome, paragraph 2.  
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distress. Two of these are of relevance for this paper: i) the balance-of-payments (BoP) 
assistance programme, reserved for EU member states outside the euro area and ii) the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), reserved for euro-area countries. By 2014, 
the EFSM had supported Ireland (€22.5 billion) and Portugal (€24.3 billion).  
The maximum commitment under the two mechanisms, which operate under the guarantee 
of the EU common budget, is €110 billion (€50 billion for the BoP assistance and €60 billion for 
the EFSM), i.e. roughly over two-thirds of the total annual value of the EU budget. Although the 
likelihood that none of the lending is repaid is small, such a sum may represent a significant risk 
for the budget. However, since the lender is the EU, the default of a member state on any 
repayment does not mean that the EU (which acts as the guarantor) is defaulting, which allows 
the EU to ‘annualise’ the risk, i.e. to record only the payment due on the particular budgetary 
year as the risk to the budget.  
To date, the EU has issued some €53 billion in outstanding bonds maturing until 2042. As a 
matter of fact, it is necessary to monitor the credit risks borne by the EU budget that result 
from guarantees and lending operations managed by the European Commission and maximise 
the potential of EU’s own resources as collateral.  
The sovereign debt crisis affecting euro area members showed the limited capacity of the EU 
budget alone to meet the financing needs of member states in financial distress and to prevent 
the contagion effects that could potentially put the stability of the euro area at risk. In response, 
a range of MFS mechanisms has been created out of the EU budget. The Greek Loan Facility (GLF) 
in 2010 and the more structured European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2011 emerged as 
temporary instruments to respond to the increasing tension brought about by the sovereign 
debt crisis. Only in 2013, thanks to a minor amendment to the Treaty,4 the creation of a 
permanent instrument, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), was allowed.   
As will be illustrated in detail below, the transitory nature of both the EFSM and EFSF, and the 
assumption that all EU member states will eventually adopt the euro, make the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) the only instrument for macro-financial stability in the EU. At the 
same time, it is also (together with its predecessor, the EFSF) the result of an interinstitutional 
agreement and as such is subject to very small, if any, parliamentary control and democratic 
accountability. 
According to the roadmap proposed in the Five Presidents’ Report on “Completing Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union” (Juncker et al., 2015), in the medium term, i.e. between 2017 
and 2025, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should become an integral part of EU law. 
                                                     
4 The new Art. 136 of the TFEU states: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of 
any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality." 
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The main objective of this paper, however, is not to explore avenues for reform, but rather to 
offer a succinct account of the recent MFS mechanisms used in Europe and to point out some 
critical aspects that should be addressed in future reforms.  
Therefore, in Section 2 below, we present an outline of the current facilities for financial 
assistance, both at the level of the Union and at the intergovernmental level. Section 3 
describes the different MFS instruments, the basic ways in which they function and the 
activities undertaken so far. Section 4 looks at the implications of the different financing 
methods for MFS instruments, which either rely on the guarantee of the EU budget or on 
guarantees generated by member states’ contributions. We conclude by highlighting some 
critical points and presenting some recommendations with the aim of: i) increasing the 
democratic control and accountability of support programmes, ii) identifying specific solutions 
for the euro area and iii) reforming the ESM.  
2. An Overview of the instruments For Financial Support 
This section offers an overview of the existing instruments for financial support to member 
states distinguishing between those operating within the EU budget framework and those 
outside. The latter, which were created after 2010, are reserved for euro area countries and 
are endowed with much larger resources than the instruments that preceded them.  
Table 1 provides a summary of their main features. The development process of each 
instrument will then be presented in more detail in the rest of this section.  
Table 1. Summary of the instruments providing financial support to EU Member States 
 EU common MFS instruments EA member states’ MFS instruments 
 Balance-of-
payments 
(BoP) Facility 
European 
Financial 
Stabilisation 
Mechanism 
(EFSM) 
Macro-
Financial 
Assistance 
(MFA)* 
Greek Loan 
Facility (GLF) 
European Financial 
Stability Facility 
(EFSF) 
European 
Stability 
Mechanism 
(ESM) 
Eligible 
countries 
Non-euro area 
EU Member 
States  
EU (mainly 
euro area) 
Member 
States  
EU neighbour 
countries 
Exclusively 
Greece 
Euro area Member 
States 
Euro area 
Member States  
Validity Permanent 
instrument 
Temporary 
instrument 
Permanent 
instrument 
Temporary 
instrument 
Temporary 
instrument 
Permanent 
instrument 
Legal basis  Council 
Regulation n° 
332/2002 
Council 
Regulation n° 
407/2010 
Art. 212 TFEU MoU  
3 May 2010 
EFSF (Amended) 
Framework 
Agreement 
Treaty 
establishing the 
ESM 
Decision-
making body 
ECOFIN 
Council 
ECOFIN 
Council and 
Eurogroup 
Council Eurogroup Eurogroup and 
EFSF BoD** 
Eurogroup and 
ESM BoD** 
Assistance 
modality  
Loans or credit 
lines 
Loans or 
credit lines 
Loans or 
grants 
Loan to Greek 
government 
- Loans 
- Intervention in 
primary and 
secondary bond 
markets 
- Loans 
- Intervention in 
primary & 
secondary bond 
market 
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- Precautionary 
programmes 
- Banks 
recapitalisation 
-Precautionary 
Programmes 
- Banks 
recapitalisation 
* Since it provides financial assistance to non-EU countries, the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme run by the 
Commission falls outside the scope of this Briefing paper.  
** BoD stands for Board of Directors. 
Source: Casale et al. (2012). 
Table 2 provides an overview of the total outstanding loans under the different instruments by 
country. The case of Greece stands out as exceptional. 
Table 2. Overview of disbursed funds outstanding by receiver and programme (€ billion) 
Lender Latvia Romania Cyprus Greece Ireland Portugal Spain 
Bilateral - - - 53 4.8 - - 
European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) 
- - - 131 17.7 26 - 
European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) 
- - 6.3 32 - - 41.3 
European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) 
- - - - 22.5 24.3 - 
Balance-of-payments (BoP) 
facility 
0.7 3.5 - - - - - 
Total 0.7 3.5 6.3 216 45 50.3 41.3 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Lastly, Table 3 provides an overview of the outstanding commitments by euro area country 
under the different mechanisms for financial stability. Each mechanism has a different 
character, not all imply monetary disbursements, and the liability they entail are all pro-rata. 
Neither the GLF, the EFSF or the ESM entails joint and several liabilities.  
Table 3. Out of EU budget commitments by (euro area) country (€ billion) 
Member state Greek Loan Facility (GLF) 
disbursed* bilateral loans 
European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFS) guarantee 
commitments** 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) capital 
subscriptions 
Austria 1.6 21.6 19.5 
Belgium 1.9 27.0 24.3 
Cyprus 0.1 1.5 1.4 
Estonia - 2.0 1.3 
Finland 1.0 14.0 12.6 
France 11.4 158.5 142.7 
Germany  15.2 211.0 190.0 
Greece - - 19.7 
Ireland 0.3 - 11.1 
Italy 10.0 139.3 125.4 
Latvia - - 1.9 
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Lithuania - - 2.9 
Lux. 0.1 1.9 1.8 
Malta 0.1 0.7 0.5 
Netherlands 3.2 44.4 40.0 
Portugal 1.1 - 17.6 
Slovakia - 7.7 5.8 
Slovenia 0.2 3.7 3.0 
Spain 6.7 92.5 83.3 
Total 52.9 726.0 704.8 
* Disbursed under the GLF, remainder of the initially committed EUR80 billion were used within the EFSF. 
**Commitments post enlargement of the fund. 
Source: European Commission. 
2.1 The Balance-of-Payments (BOP) facility 
As mentioned earlier, the Balance-of-payments (BoP) facility is directly managed by the 
Commission which, backed by EU own resources, borrows on the financial markets and lends 
to member states outside the common currency area. It is designed to provide financial 
assistance to those non-euro countries that are encountering problems with their balance of 
payments, as specified in Art. 143 TFEU.  
The Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance provides medium/long-term financial resources to 
ease a country’s external financing constraints and allow it to return promptly to borrow 
directly in the financial markets. Technically, the BoP assistance provides loans solely by the EU, 
but recently the Commission has granted support in co-operation with the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the IMF and other international institutions. 
In institutional terms, the first evaluation on granting financial assistance to a country that 
makes such a request falls in the hands of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC).5 
Following a formal request of the Commission, the Council must approve it by a qualified 
majority.  
BoP assistance is granted if the recipient member state presents a sound economic and 
financial adjustment programme. The Commission, in consultation with the European Central 
Bank (ECB), coordinates with the potential beneficiary to identify the necessary measures that 
should be part of the adjustment programme to speed up the country’s return to international 
financial markets and correct imbalances in its balance of payments. Casale et al. (2012) further 
point out that in order for the EU assistance programme to be fully established, the 
Commission, in collaboration with the IMF (or other programme partners) and the EFC agrees 
upon a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the member state that benefits from the 
BoP facility. The MoU contains the details of the economic policies outlined in the adjustment 
                                                     
5 Currently chaired by Thomas Wieser. For more information, see http://europa.eu/efc/welcome-economic-and-
financial-committee-efc-website_en. 
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programme endorsed by the Council. According to Casale et al. (2012), conditions are usually 
related to: i) fiscal consolidation, e.g. reduction of the government deficit; ii) structural reforms 
(e.g. labour market reform, liberalisation of the economy); iii) reforming the public 
administration; and iv) measures to safeguard against fraud. Every six months a progress review 
is conducted, which clarifies whether modifications are in order.  
The BoP lending capacity has been progressively increased over time, but it remains rather 
limited. In 2002 the total outstanding amount of loans to be allocated to member states out of 
the common currency area was of €12 billion.6 This amount was then increased to €25 billion 
in 2008,7 and today has reached the current total lending capacity of €50 billion.8  
In terms of type of financial assistance, the BoP facility can hand out loans or lines of credit. 
Funds are collected by the Commission at the lowest possible cost, obtained so far by issuing 
debt securities on the market.  
Table 4. Overview of recent balance-of-payments assistance programmes 
Country Total international 
financial assistance / 
of which EU financial 
assistance 
Disburse-
ments made 
by the EU 
Disbursement 
period covered 
by EU assistance 
Status of the programme  
(as of Jan. 2012) 
Hungary €20.0 bn / €6.5 bn €55 bn Until November 
2010 
Post-programme surveillance; 
availability of the unclaimed EU 
financial assistance (€1 bn) expired 
in November 2010 
Latvia €7.5 bn / €3.1 bn €2.9 bn Until January 
2012 
Post-programme surveillance; 
Disbursements completed 
Part of bilateral funding will be 
treated as credit lines 
Romania I €20.0 bn / €5.0 bn €5.0 bn Until June 2011 Post-programme surveillance; 
Disbursements completed 
Romania II €5.0 bn / €1.4 bn    Until March 
2013 
Precautionary (not activated) 
Romania III €4.0 bn / €2.0 bn   Until September 
2015  
Precautionary (not activated)  
Source: European Commission, January 2017 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/balance_of_payments/index_en.htm).  
Table 4 and Box 1 provide an account of the utilisation of the BoP assistance, which has been 
mainly used in the framework of bigger international financial programmes. After the 
reintroduction of the BoP programme in 2002, the first assistance programme was granted to 
Hungary in 2008. Aside from Hungary, only Latvia and Romania benefitted from the 
programme. The latter remains under the post-programme surveillance), as €3.5 billion are 
                                                     
6 Council Regulation No.332/2002. 
7 Regulation No 1360/2008. 
8 Regulation No 431/2009. 
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currently outstanding9. Under the post-programme surveillance period, the member state that 
has to repay the loan is required to discuss new major policy reforms and intentions with the 
Commission.10 Furthermore, in the context of the European Semester, the Commission 
maintains close cooperation with the BoP beneficiary to uphold a sound fiscal and 
macroeconomic framework.  
Box 1. Recap of BoP interventions, by country 
 
Source: Casale et al. (2012) and authors’ own research. 
                                                     
9 As Latvia already repaid over 75% of the EU loan under BoP, it is no longer under post-programme surveillance. 
As reported in table 2, €0.7 bn remain outstanding.  
10 The EFC can also be involved if the Commission has concerns about a potential worsening of the Member State’s 
ability to repay the financial assistance.  
Hungary
• In 2008, to relieve the pressure on the country's financial markets, the Balance-of-payments (BoP) facility provided €6.5 
billion as part of an international financial programme which amounted to €20 billion (Council Decision 14953/2/08).
• Out of the €6.5 billion, only €5.5 billon were actually disbursed and the availability of unclaimed financial assistance 
expired in 2010, when the programme ended. 
• In 2011, Hungary  requested new assistance under the BoP facility; the request was not approved by the Council, which 
also adopted a decision suspending €495 million in scheduled commitments under the EU's cohesion fund, due to 
insufficient measures taken by the country to correct its budget deficit.
• The post-programme surveillance (PPS) was discontinued in January 2015, as Hungary has repaid more than 70% of the 
loan. 
Latvia
• Motivated by concerns over the health of the domestic banking sector, the Latvian government requested financial 
assistance in late 2008 from the EU, IMF and regional neighbours. 
• The EU agreed to contribute with a €3.1 billion three-year lending programme as part of a multilateral financial 
assistance amounting to €7.5 billion.
• The repayments started in 2014, including the principal and interests of approximately 3.2%.
• In January 2012, Latvia officially completed the assistance programme,  and the PPS also expired in 2015, as over 75% of 
the EU loan had been repaid. 
Romania
• Currently under the precautionary programme activated up to €1.4 billion.
• Council agreed on May 2011 to support the re-launch of growth with a focus on structural reforms and fiscal 
sustainability (Council Decision 2011/288/EU).
• This latter programme follows the first assistance programme worth €20 billion provided for the 2009-2011 period: €5 
billion BoP, €13 billion IMF, and the remaining €2 billion by WB, EIB and EBRD (Council Decision 2009/459/EC).
• The repayment of the 2009 loan started in 2015 and includes the principal and the interest of approximately 3%.
• The ongoing PPS foresees a regular exchange of information between the Romanian authorities and the Commission, 
which visits biannually and assesses the country's financial situation. 
• At this time, €3.5 billion are outstanding, and the PPS may end in mid-2018, when 70% of the loan under the first 
programme is expected to be repaid. 
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2.2 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) 
Created in May 2010, the EFSM was one of the first responses to the sovereign debt crisis 
affecting euro area countries. It basically mirrors the functioning of the BoP facility, but the 
facility is designed only for euro area member states. The scope of the EFSM, however, is wider 
than that of the BoP facility; in fact, it is more designed to provide assistance to euro area 
countries that are experiencing financial problems in general, and not necessarily a balance-of-
payments crisis. 
As per the BoP assistance, EFSM assistance is linked to an adjustment programme and a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Council and the Commission. Institutionally 
speaking, the relevant difference is that the EFC is involved only in the euro area configuration: 
the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG). Furthermore, the ECB acts for this facility as a sort of 
fiscal agent, which administers the loans between the European Commission and the 
beneficiary’s central bank.  
An additional difference from the BoP pertains to the possibility to borrow from international 
capital markets more funds than those actually needed according to the disbursement 
schedule. This allows the Commission, when operations so require, to keep borrowed funds in 
a dedicated cash or security account,11 with the objective of borrowing at the lowest feasible 
cost. 
The monitoring is strengthened: i) the Commission runs quarterly checks on the developments 
of the adjustment programme; ii) every six months the Commission reports to the Council and 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on the developments of the imbalances that 
justified the EU support and iii) the Court of Auditors has the right to carry out audits and 
financial controls (Casale et al., 2012). 
The total lending capacity is fixed at €60 billion, just above that of the BoP. As with other macro-
financial stability (MFS) instruments, the Commission often provides European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) support in the framework of wider and multilateral 
international assistance programmes, in partnership with the IMF and other financial 
institutions. For instance, the first time the EFSM was activated,12 the €22.5 billion of EFSM 
support to Ireland represented approximately one-third of a bigger international bailout 
package, which also involved the IMF, the EFSF and bilateral loans from Sweden, Denmark and 
the UK. Also in the case of Portugal,13 the €26 billion assistance via EFSM amounted to just one-
third of the total bailout package, where also the IMF and the EFSF were involved.   
                                                     
11 Which is operated under the rules applying to off-budget operations. Such funds can only be employed to 
provide financial support via the EFSM and all the costs incurred by EU institutions in implementing the financial 
assistance falls on the beneficiary.  
12 Council Decision 17211/10 of 7 December 2010. 
13 Council Decision 10231/11 of 17 May 2011. 
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In total, the EFSM has disbursed €46.8 billion over the period 2011-14; Table 5 provides a list of 
the different operations and their agreed maturity. 
Table 5. Overview of recent European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) programmes 
Date raised  Amount  
(€ billion) 
Maturity Beneficiary Date of disbursement  
5 Jan. 2011 5.00  7  Ireland 12 Jan. 2011 
17 Mar. 2011 3.40  10  Ireland 24 Mar. 2011 
24 May 2011 4.75  5  €3 billion for Ireland;  
€1.75 billion for Portugal 
31 May 2011 
25 May 2011 4.75  10 Portugal 1 Jun. 2011 
14 Sept. 2011 5.00  15 Portugal 21 Sept. 2011 
22 Sept. 2011 4.00 7 €2 billion for Ireland;  
€2 billion for Portugal 
29 Sept. 2011 
29 Sept. 2011 1.10 30  €0.5 billion for Ireland;  
€0.6 billion for Portugal 
6 Oct. 2011 
9 Jan. 2012 3.00 20  €1.5 billion for Ireland;  
€1.5 billion for Portugal 
16 Jan. 2012 
27 Feb. 2012 3.00 26  Ireland 5 Mar. 2012 
17 Apr. 2012 1.80 10  Portugal 24 Apr. 2012 
26 Apr. 2012 2.70 15  Portugal 4 May 2012 
26 Jun. 2012 2.30 15  Ireland 3 July 2012 
23 Oct. 2012 3.00 10  €1 billion Ireland; 
€2 billion Portugal 
30 Oct. 2012 
18 Mar. 2014 2.60 15  €0.8 billion Ireland; 
€1.8 billion Portugal 
25 Mar. 2014 
5 Nov. 2014 0.40 15  Portugal 12 Nov. 2014 
– 7.16  7  Greece 20 June 2015 
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN website. 
In July 2013, the Council adopted the decision to extend the maturities of the loans to Ireland 
and Portugal both under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This implied increasing the average maturity by seven years, 
from 12.5 years to 19.5 years, in order to smoothen the countries' debt redemption profiles 
and lower their refinancing needs in the period subsequent to their economic adjustment 
programmes.  
In 2015, Ireland requested to lengthen the first EFSM loan of €5 billion disbursed in 2011, which 
was due in December 2015. The loan was refinanced in three transactions with maturities in 
2023 (€2 billion), 2029 (€1billion) and 2035 (€2 billion). In January 2016, the Portuguese 
government also requested a lengthening of the second EFSM loan of €4.75 billion disbursed 
in 2011 and due in June 2016. Refinancing has been scheduled in three transactions maturing 
in 2023 (€1.5 billion), 2031 (€2.25 billion) and 2036 (€1 billion). 
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Recently, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) has also been employed for 
bridge loans. In July 2015, it provided short-term assistance of €7.16 billion to Greece. The loan 
was fully repaid one month later in August 2015.  
Aside from these limited activities covering the lengthening of the maturities of outstanding 
loans and the disbursement of bridge loans, the EFSM is no longer the reference macro-
financial stability (MFS) instrument for euro area countries. As will be explained below, since 
2013, EU member states in the euro area that experience severe financial distress can turn to 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Already in December 2010, the Council conclusions 
singled out the ESM as the programme intended to “replace the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), which will remain 
in force until June 2013.”14 
2.3 The Greek Loan Facility 
As is clear from its name, the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) is an ad hoc macro-financial stability 
(MFS) instrument, which turned out to be needed, as Greece was not eligible for Balance-of-
payments (BoP) assistance and up to 2010, no other assistance programme was in place at 
European level. The dramatic situation affecting Greece made clear that euro area member 
states actually needed access to financial assistance and that more resources were required to 
safeguard stability. As a matter of fact, the GLF allocated loans worth €77.3 billion to Greece, 
an amount that exceeded the sum that was available at the time for the stability of the whole 
collection of non-euro member states via the BoP facility.  
As the resources available were insufficient to cope with the sovereign debt crisis and were not 
targeted to euro area countries, other instruments had to be found to preserve the stability of 
European economies. While the political consensus was emerging to design a specific MFS 
instrument for the euro area, the urgency brought about the financial distress of Greece led to 
the creation of the Greek Loan Facility (GLF), before the EFSM and EFSF were constituted.  
The solution that was found rests on bilateral loans from other EU member states. In this case, 
the Commission does not act as a borrower, but rather is entrusted with the tasks of 
coordinating and administering the pooled bilateral loans, in liaison with the ECB. Such an 
intergovernmental system “clearly represented an interim solution before the establishment 
of a more structured (EFSF) or permanent (ESM) mechanisms”.15 
Following a formal request of the Greek government for international financial assistance, in 
May 2010, EU governments agreed on a financial assistance programme in partnership with 
the IMF. Out of the total €110 billion provided in the framework of the three-year adjustment 
programme, 16 euro area countries, through pooled bilateral loans, agreed to provide about 
                                                     
14 See European Council (2011), EUCO 30/1/10 Conclusions, Rev1, Brussels, 25 January 2011.  
15 Casale et al. (2012, p. 36). 
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€80 billion. Finally, the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) consisted of €53 billion of bilateral loans, as 
Slovakia opted out and Ireland and Portugal revised their contribution since they were also 
under a financial assistance programme. For the rest, the contributions to the GLF were fixed 
on the basis of the ECB capital key.16  
Greece and the Commission agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlining a 
programme to redress internal and external imbalances. The disbursement of the loan over the 
three-year term was provided in five tranches and was based on the assessment of the 
performance on a set of criteria defined by the Commission.  
When it was clear that the first Greek financial assistance programme would not have been 
sufficient, the Eurogroup approved the financing of a second adjustment programme worth 
€130 billion, of which €102 billion came under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).17 
The shift from the first to the second assistance programme entailed a switch from the ad-hoc 
Greek Loan Facility (GLF) to the more structured EFSF, which actually disbursed the last tranche 
of the loan available under GLF. With the exception of the repayments of the debt by Greece, 
the activities of the GLF ended in 2011.  
2.4 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
Following up on the Greek crisis, which showed the inadequacy of the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) resources guaranteed by the EU budget to deal with such a 
large crisis and the need to resort to bilateral loans, the euro area member states decided in 
2010 to set up an additional pool of funds to support euro area countries in financial distress, 
called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Its main aim was to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area by providing financial assistance to countries at times when markets 
rates would be unsustainably high and before market access is lost. In 2011, the EFSF’s scope 
of activity was enlarged to allow for precautionary programmes, recapitalisation of financial 
institutions and interventions in the secondary sovereign security markets (EFSF, 2011). 
The EFSF was created as a temporary mechanism to deal with the sovereign debt crisis that 
started with Greece and it has provided financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
through the issuance of EFSF bonds and other debt instruments on capital markets. Since 2013 
the EFSF does not provide any more financial assistance, as this task is now performed solely 
by the ESM (see next paragraph). Nevertheless, the EFSF continues to operate to receive loan 
repayments from beneficiary countries, make interest and principal payments to holders of 
EFSF bonds and roll over outstanding EFSF bonds, as the maturity of loans provided to Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece is longer than the maturity of bonds issued by the EFSF. 
                                                     
16 Table 2 reports the details of contributions by country. 
17 More details are presented in section 3.2. The IMF contributed €28 billion. 
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Formally the EFSF is a private company incorporated under Luxembourg law, owned by 
member states of the euro area and structured as a temporary credit-enhanced special 
purpose vehicle, with minimal capitalisation and guarantees given by the 17 euro area member 
states to raise funds from the capital markets on its investment grade rating.18 Initially the EFSF 
was set up with €440 billion of guarantees, which was increased in 2011 to €780 billion to allow 
an effective lending capacity of €440 billion (the over-collateralisation was the requirement to 
keep the AAA rating on the issuances). The key percentage of the guarantees given by each 
member state is defined in accordance with its share in the paid-up capital of the ECB.  
One key feature of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was that the financial 
assistance can be released following an official request made by a euro area member state and 
the commitment of the country to undertake a macroeconomic, IMF-style adjustment 
programme. The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and the IMF, together called the Troika, 
is in charge of conducting an analysis of the sustainability of the public debt of the concerned 
country and assessing its financing needs. On these bases, the programme is negotiated and 
included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). During the assistance programme, the 
Commission (together with the IMF and the ECB) is responsible for the monitoring activity, 
reporting directly to the Council and the EFSF Board of Governors (BoG), which decide on the 
disbursement of the new tranches of the loan. 
The EFSF was activated for the ad-hoc assistance programmes to Ireland (€17.7 billion) and 
Portugal (€26 billion). Moreover, when the second adjustment programme for Greece was 
agreed, it was also decided to use the EFSF as a vehicle for a €180 billion loan. In this framework, 
the EFSF managed the undisbursed tranches of the GLF, provided additional funds for Greek 
banking sector recapitalisation process and also performed additional tasks linked to the debt 
restructuring of 2012 (see Casale et al., 2012, for details). 
Table 6. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) assistance programmes (€billion) 
Country Agreed amount Disbursed Period covered  Other partners 
Ireland  
17.7 12.0 2010-2013 
IMF, EFSM and bilateral loans UK, 
DN SW 
Portugal 26.0 9.6 2011-2014 IMF and EFSM 
Greece II 179.6 103.7 2011-2015 IMF 
* As of May 2012.  
Source: EFSF (www.esm.europa.eu/efsf-overview).  
2.5 The European Stability Mechanism 
Soon after the EFSF was set up, it become clear that a crisis-resolution mechanism should not 
only be large in size but also permanent. In this vein, the EFSF became de facto permanent in 
the form of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
                                                     
18 For a detail description of the institutional framework and its functioning, see Casale et al. (2012). 
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The treaty establishing the ESM was signed in June 2011 by the finance ministers of the 17 euro 
area countries. The treaty builds on an amendment of Art. 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).19 The ESM is designed as an intergovernmental organisation 
under public international law, with a planned lending capacity amounting to €500 billion. 
Operational since July 2012, the ESM was expected to take over the tasks of EFSF and EFSM, 
using the same instruments as under the EFSF, as summarised below.   
Figure 1. European Stability Mechanism instruments 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on Casale et al. (2012) and ESM website. 
Since its creation the ESM has provided loans to Greece and Cyprus. Spain also received a loan 
to support banks’ recapitalisation.20 (See Annex for amounts disbursed.) 
ESM loans are always tied to strict conditionality. This usually involves an agreed path of fiscal 
consolidation, governance measures as well as financial-sector stabilisation and structural 
reform measures to improve the business environment and support growth. Figure 2 illustrates 
the formal procedure, which is similar to that of the EFSF.  
                                                     
19 The European Council adopted a decision to amend the TFEU, adding a new paragraph to Art. 136: “The Member 
States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard 
the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism 
will be made subject to strict conditionality.” 
20 See www.esm.europa.eu for details. 
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Figure 2. European Stability Mechanism procedure for financial assistance 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on Casale et al. (2012). Notes: EA MS: Euro area member state, EWG: Eurogroup Working 
Group, BoG: Board of Governors. 
The usual assumption of the various assistance programmes drafted by the Troika of 
international lenders (Commission, IMF and ECB) was that the requesting country faced a 
temporary liquidity crisis. Under this hypothesis, a relatively short and sharp macroeconomic 
adjustment effort is expected to be sufficient to resolve problems, which usually arise from 
external fiscal and external deficits. The financial assistance combined with the promise of 
adjustment make it possible to regain access to international capital markets.  
Ex-post it seems that for Ireland and Portugal the assumption has proven correct; in the case 
of Greece it turned out to be wrong. Since 2010, Greece has undergone three adjustment 
programmes, a debt restructuring through the PSI (private sector involvement) and a further 
restructuring through maturity extensions. Yet no consensus has been reached on its debt 
sustainability.  
With reference to the financial assistance function, there are two main differences between 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM). First, 
of the €700 billion of ESM-subscribed capital, €80 billion are paid-in capital shares, and €620 
billion are callable shares.21 In principle, this division ensures the AAA rating even in the absence 
of credit-enhancement schemes (the EFSF had an over-guarantee, cash buffer and reserves).  
                                                     
21 These amounts are split among euro area member states according to their capital contribution key in the ECB 
(see Table 3 above). 
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Second, while the European Financial Stability Facility  (like the EFSM and the BoP facility) has 
the same credit right as any other sovereign claim, the “ESM loans [will] enjoy preferred 
creditor status in a similar fashion to those of the IMF, while accepting preferred creditor status 
of the IMF over the ESM”.22 
As result of an international treaty outside the TFEU, the functioning of the European Stability 
Mechanism does not entail any direct involvement of the EU institutions. 
3. Financing the Balance-of-Payment (BOP) facility and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) in the EU budget 
The macro-financial stability (MFS) programmes managed by the Commission rely on the EU 
budget as a guarantee. The EU cannot borrow to finance a budget deficit, but borrowing can be 
conducted for MFS instruments with the involvement of direct and unconditional obligations 
of the EU. Such obligations, however, are implicitly guaranteed by EU member states, given 
that they are legally obliged to provide funds to meet all of the EU’s obligations23 (Casale et al., 
2012).  
It is necessary to monitor the credit risks borne by the EU budget resulting from the guarantees 
given and the lending operations implemented directly by the European Union or indirectly 
through the guarantee granted for EIB financing projects outside the Union. Presently the EU 
has about €53 billion in outstanding bonds from the BoP facility and EFSM, which will mature 
up until 2042.  
For both the BoP facility and the EFSM, the risk is directly covered by the EU budget. As reported 
in European Commission (2016), the BoP facility has an outstanding capital of €42 billion and 
approximately €100 million of accrued interest. The EFSM instead represents 56.4% of all 
outstanding amounts covered by the EU budget (including other guarantees, such as EIB 
operations), as it has an outstanding capital of €46.8 billion and accrued interest of €709 million 
(European Commission (2016). 
No debt-servicing cost is foreseen for the Union as the interest payments and loan principal is 
repaid by the beneficiary member state via the Commission. 
The 2015 amendment to the Regulation of the EFSM24 has de facto broken with the ‘joint and 
several’ commitment of all Member States for the EU budget, and thus to some extent the 
unity of the budget. De jure, the obligation of all Member States remains unchanged, but in 
practice, a sub-group of member states, e.g. the euro area, becomes jointly liable, therefore 
setting preliminary steps towards an own budget.  
                                                     
22 See Treaty establishing the ESM, p. 7. 
23 See Arts 310 and 323 of the TFEU.  
24 Council Regulation 2015/1360 of August 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 establishing a European 
financial stabilisation mechanism.  
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One observation has to be made concerning equal treatment in risk-sharing between euro area 
and non-euro area member states. It seems rather inconsistent to operate two macro-financial 
stability instruments targeted at a subset of member states, in one of which the risk is jointly 
held at sub-group level (the EFSM25), whereas for the other subgroup, the risk is borne by all 
member states equally (the BoP facility). One might be tempted to argue that only non-euro 
MSs should be involved in the latter.  
In their study for the EP, Casale et al. (2012) are critical of the notion of using the core 
architecture of the EU budget to safeguard macro-financial stability. They argue that its 
relatively small size and inflexible rules make it unfit to deploy macroeconomic financial stability 
instruments, when needed. In fact, the recent development of macro-financial stability 
instruments occurred outside the guarantee of the European common resources. But the 
reason cannot be imputed solely to the limited EU budget. At the political level, there was a 
preference for developments in an intergovernmental setting where member states, through 
the Eurogroup, can more stringently monitor and influence adjustment programmes and their 
progress.  
3.1 Some considerations on the general principles of the budget 
One of the questions arising from the existence of instruments for macro-financial stability is 
to what extent are they in line with the general principles of the EU budget, in particular the 
principle of unity.  
The principle of unity stipulates in Art. 7 of the Financial Regulation (European Commission, 
2014) that the EU budget shall comprise all revenues and institutional and operational 
expenditures occasioned by the provisions of the TEU and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. It also requires (Art. 7 §2) the recording of the “guarantees for borrowing and 
lending operations entered into by the Union, including the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism and Balance of Payment Facility operations, in accordance with point (d) of Article 
49(1)”. 
Thus the EFSM and the BoP facility are formally in line with the unity principle of the financial 
regulation, but, as mentioned above, in practice the EFSM is a budget for a subset of member 
states (eurozone members) and agreements have been reached to reduce or exclude any 
liability on the part of non-euro member states towards it.  
The European Stability Mechanism, being outside the TEU, is a separate financial instrument, 
outside the EU budget remit and with its own governance structure. As such, it is de jure not 
affecting the unity of the EU budget. However, if the ESM is brought into the Treaty, the 
question of how it will be financed and the role of the institutions, including democratic control 
by the EP, will have to be addressed.  
                                                     
25  With the amendment introduced in 2015. See footnote 22.  
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More questionable is the aspect of the compliance with the principle of transparency. Are the 
liabilities of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism presented in a sufficiently 
transparent manner for the member states (or other stakeholders) to be aware of the 
outstanding risk on future EU budget margins? In the Council Regulation laying down the 
multiannual financial framework (1311/2013), the potential liabilities of the BoP facility and the 
EFSM are only mentioned in the preamble: “If it is necessary to mobilise the guarantees given 
under the general budget of the Union for the loans provided under the Balance of Payment 
Facility or the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 
332/2002 and in Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010, respectively, the necessary amount 
should be mobilised over and above the ceilings of the commitments and payments 
appropriations of the MFF, while respecting the own-resources ceiling.” The actual risks in the 
margins are not presented in the multiannual financial framework. 
Similarly, the Interinstitutional Agreement (2013/C 373/01) mentions in paragraph 16 the 
requirement for annual reports from the Commission on the guarantees covered by the general 
budget to fulfil the transparency requirements. 
The latest actual report on the guarantees (COM(2016) 576 final) does present an overview of 
the operations and the budgetary risk on the completed financial year, but some of the finer 
details of the mechanisms are not presented; nor are all future liabilities, which need to be 
looked up separately. The procedures to be followed in case of a default are also not presented. 
3.2 Lack of procedural clarity in case of defaults 
The use of the Balance-of-payments facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
and their size open a number of questions if a default occurs in any particular year. The authors 
have reached the following tentative conclusions but they emphasise that this topic needs 
further analysis:  
 The defaulting member state would remain liable for the sum that the EU will have to raise 
to cover the default.  
 The EU would use the GNI key contributions to raise the funds needed to cover the annual 
shortfall. 
 The defaulting member state should in principle have to finance its own default based on its 
GNI share. 
Among the questions require further consideration are the following: 
 If the member state contributes to its own default by the increased GNI payment to the EU 
budget to cover the default, will this payment be deducted from the outstanding balance? 
 How exactly will the amount be recovered for which the defaulting member state remains 
liable? 
 Are corrections (e.g. the UK rebate) applicable to the extra contribution to the budget to 
cover the default?  
THE INSTRUMENTS PROVIDING MACRO-FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO EU MEMBER STATES | 21 
 
 Will the UK still be liable for the lending risks of the EFSM and the BoP facility after exiting the 
EU? Based on budgetary rules, the UK would normally be liable for the commitments taken 
by the budget in the years when it was still a member. This is less clear, however, in the case 
of the EFSM26 and BoP facility, because the risk is recorded on an annual basis in future 
budgetary margins. And these are not recorded in full in the budget margin when the loan 
support is transferred to the beneficiary country. Does this mean that the liability in case of 
default falls only on the member states at the time of the default, and not on those that were 
members when the funds were transferred to the beneficiary country? 
3.3 Some considerations on the Eurozone budget and the European Stability 
Mechanism 
At the present time, discussion is underway concerning the possibility of creating a eurozone 
fiscal capacity. This has given rise to the misapprehension that this budget would take over the 
role or the resources of the European Stability Mechanism. It is difficult to know how the 
governance structure of the euro area will evolve in the medium term, but at this stage but it 
is important to highlight that the ESM and a eurozone fiscal capacity would respond to two 
different policy objectives. The eurozone budget would provide resources to perform a 
macroeconomic stabilisation function for the euro area, for instance though a common 
unemployment benefits scheme (see for instance Beblávy et al., 2015 and CEPS, 2017). 
Conversely, the ESM is a macro-financial stability mechanism, which kicks in in case sovereigns 
are confronted with serious macro-financial instability and should have a separate set-up. This 
implies that in the first case the policy objective is that of countering the economic cycle and 
mitigate the effect of asymmetric shocks; in the second, the policy objective is pertaining more 
to the overall stability of the euro area through containing the risk of contagion of banking or a 
sovereign debt crisis. This idea of having distinct functions and instruments is supported by the 
Five Presidents’ report (Juncker et al., 2015), which states that “It (a macroeconomic 
stabilisation system) should not be an instrument for crisis management. The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) already performs that function. Instead, its role should be to improve the 
overall economic resilience of EMU and individual euro area countries. It would thus help to 
prevent crises and actually make future interventions by the ESM less likely.” 
3.4 Accountability and democratic control  
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
are independent entities established by agreement or international treaty among the euro area 
member states and, as emphasised above, are thus outside the framework of the EU treaties. 
                                                     
26 The 2015 amendment to EFSM regulation should exempt the UK from liabilities incurred at euro area level. 
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The European Parliament was not involved in any capacity in negotiating the treaty establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism.27 Its absence was in part determined by the legal basis on 
which the ESM Treaty was formulated. Indeed, in 2011, the European Parliament approved the 
amendment to Art. 136 of the TFEU, clearing the way for the ESM Treaty to be adopted. Such 
approval was negotiated against the promise that the European Commission would play a 
central role in running the ESM and that the intergovernmental mechanism would be 
eventually brought within the EU framework. This has not yet happened, but the roadmap for 
the EMU institutional reforms contained in the Five Presidents report – stage two (i.e. 2017-
2025) – calls for the integration of the ESM into the EU law framework in order to strengthen 
democratic accountability and legitimacy.  
As for the current situation, in 2011, the President of the Eurogroup and the Ecfin 
Commissioner committed on behalf of the Council and the Commission to inform the European 
Parliament on a regular basis about the establishment and the operations of the ESM. The 
President of the Eurogroup, as chair of the EMS, can be invited to discuss some aspects of the 
operation of the ESM,28 which happened for instance in the case of extending financial 
assistance to Cyprus. In addition, the ESM sends its annual report and audit report to the 
European Parliament, but there is no formal accountability process. 
The ESM Treaty gives the Commission an important role in negotiating the conditionality 
attached to financial assistance and in monitoring compliance with it.29 This means that the 
European Parliament can exercise a small degree of democratic scrutiny over the ESM, which 
is limited to the Commission’s use of EU resources for its work in the ESM framework.30 This 
scrutiny does not cover the use of ESM resources for financial assistance.  
In fact, given the ESM structure, democratic control over the actions of the member states with 
regard to the ESM is in the hand of national parliaments. Because of their nature, however, 
national parliaments tend to focus on the interest, mostly financial, of their country and not on 
the functioning of the mechanism as a whole.  
Among many commentators, there is a widespread feeling that EMU should continue in its 
process of political integration, which would resolve many of the issues raised above. The 
                                                     
27 The European Parliament participated in the negotiations of the Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and 
Governance of the EMU and of the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
28 See Annex 3 of the European Parliament resolution of 23 March 2011 on the draft European Council decision 
amending Art. 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for 
member states whose currency is the euro (www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2011-0103+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#BKMD-4). 
29 As mentioned above, the Commission does not act alone, but in liaison with the ECB and IMF, the so-called Troika. 
In the past the role and responsibility of each of the three institutions has lacked transparency and raised a lot of 
questions about democratic accountability. In the future, given the changes in governance, the ECB is likely to play a 
much more limited role and should elect to leave the Troika (see Gros, 2015).  
30 See Alcidi et al. (2014). 
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proposals to create a parliament for the euro area or to appoint a finance minister,31 or form a 
Treasury are all trying to respond the same question. 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
The crisis and its management have set up a steep learning curve. Instruments had to be 
created rapidly and adapted to new circumstances. Now is an opportune moment to sit back 
and extract the lessons learned in terms of the functioning and institutional arrangements of 
the financial support programmes to start designing an architecture that can serve Europe for 
decades to come. There are a number of lessons learnt and a few crucial issues that still need 
to be resolved.  
The most important lesson was that members of the euro area may need financial assistance 
to address macro-financial instability, just as non-euro area member states and, potentially, on 
a much larger scale. 
The unpreparedness of the euro area to respond to the crisis led to the creation of many ad 
hoc macro-financial stability (MFS) instruments, which now need to be rationalised. Three of 
the existing facilities, the Greek Loan Facility (GLF), the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), seem to be headed towards 
a slow winding down process and their tasks are progressively being taken aboard by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Moreover, given that in the long term all EU Member 
States will have adopted the euro as their currency, the Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance 
facility is also destined to disappear. These processes imply that, in the long term, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) will remain the only macro-financial stability (MFS) instrument.  
The Euro area needs a strong and well-functioning financial stabilisation mechanism which 
caters for the euro area stability and is in line with European objectives. The Euro area and its 
Member states cannot rely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that has the mandate is 
to safeguard global financial stability. In a future crisis within the euro area the IMF might thus 
decline to intervene if the global financial system is stable, whatever happens inside the euro 
area. Any threat to the stability of the euro area merits a common response because (as we 
have seen) the cost of a financial/banking crisis can be very large and requiring an urgent 
response to limit the damage.   
This eventuality raises fundamental questions about how to construct a coherent ‘financial 
arm’ of the EU and where to place the European Stability Mechanism.  
As mentioned above, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will, at some point, be 
integrated into the EU law framework, but there has been no thinking yet about how this will 
be done, about its linkages, if any, with the EU budget and about how to ensure democratic 
                                                     
31 See for instance Enderlein & Haas (2015). 
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control over its operations and the prejudice it will possibly encounter as a result of the 
budgetary sovereignty exercised by national Parliaments. 
These are complex questions requiring in-depth analysis. At this stage, two extreme options can 
be considered as a starting point: 
1) A first option would be to integrate the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU law 
framework, mimicking the structure of the existing European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM), with all the implications this entails in terms of EU budget and 
parliamentary oversight. This would mean a radical transformation of the current ESM. 
2) A second option is to re-create the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a new EU stand-
alone, independent institution, with its own staff and democratic accountability mechanism. 
This would imply that the ESM is not only in charge of providing financial assistance but it is 
also responsible for the design, the negotiation and the monitoring of the adjustment 
programme, which defines the conditionality for the disbursement. In performing its tasks, it 
should be accountable to the European Parliament for the overall functioning of the 
mechanism. 
The latter option is in line with the proposal to create a European Monetary Fund, as suggested 
by Gros & Mayer (2010), even though such a proposal aimed at establishing a risk-based system 
to constitute a real ex-ante fund, not unlike the SRF, to finance future operations. The European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) financing is different and unlikely to change. 
Another issue relates to the ‘transition’ period, which is likely to still be long, before the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) becomes the only macro-financial stability instrument, 
and whether the Balance-of-payments (BoP) assistance should remain separate from the ESM 
or become an arm of it.  
Similar questions hold for the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). A large part 
of the lending capacity of the EFSM will not be available until 2042 because it has been used 
up by very long-term loans to Portugal and Ireland. One way to re-establish the lending capacity 
of the EFSM would be to transfer its existing outstanding loans to the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).32 Such an operation would also clarify that the risk under EFSM lending falls 
only on euro area member states. This is the case anyway for new loans under the August 2015 
addendum, but only in an indirect way, as the euro area member states promise to indemnify 
the non-euro area states in case there is a loss from an EFSM operation.   
The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) would, by itself, not constitute an 
important instrument if a systemic euro crisis were to return. However, if fully available, its €60 
billion could make a decisive contribution in the event that only one of the smaller member 
states had difficulties. In any event, the amounts needed in a future crisis should be more 
                                                     
32 Technically this would work only if the bonds issued by the Commission could be called early and the ESM could 
refinance the operations at the same rate as used by the Commission. 
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limited given the Banking Union, which should limit the over-lending at the national level, and 
the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).33 For any one country of a GDP below €300 billion, the EFSM 
could provide up to 20% of GDP and thus constitutes a key element for a rescue package. Given 
that there are over 15 member states below this size, it cannot be excluded that at some point 
in the future only a limited amount might be needed. Viewed from this perspective, the EFSM 
could then turn out to be an important instrument to be used under the normal Community 
decision-making mechanisms and the scrutiny of the European Parliament.   
                                                     
33 Also close to €60 billion on its own when fully constituted. 
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Annex 
Table A1. ESM disbursements to Greece 
Date of 
disbursement 
Amount disbursed 
(€ bn) 
Maturity* Cumulative amount 
disbursed (€ bn)  
20/08/2015 13.0 Amortisation from 2034 to 2059 13.0 
24/11/2015 2.0 Amortisation from 2034 to 2059 15.0 
1/12/2015 2.7  Interim maturity coinciding with maturity of 
ESM notes** 
17.7 
8/12/2015 2.7  Interim maturity coinciding with maturity of 
ESM notes** 
20.4 
23/12/2015 1.0  Amortisation from 2034 to 2059 21.4 
21/06/2016 7.5 Amortisation from 2034 to 2059 28.9 
26/10/2016 2.8 Amortisation from 2034 to 2059 31.7 
* Weighted average maturity of loans (excluding cashless disbursements): 31.97 years.  
**The final maturity will be in line with the maximum weighted average loan maturity of 32.5 years. 
Table A2. ESM disbursements to Cyprus 
Date of 
disbursement 
Amount disbursed 
(€bn) 
Maturity* Cumulative amount 
disbursed  (€bn) 
13/05/2013 1.00 13/05/2026  
13/05/2013 1.00 13/05/2027 2.00 
26/06/2013 1.00 26/06/2028 3.00 
27/09/2013 0.75 27/09/2029  
27/09/2013 0.75 27/09/2030 4.50 
19/12/2013 0.10 19/12/2029 4.60 
4/4/2014 0.15 4/4/2030 4.75 
9/7/2014 0.60 9/7/2031 5.35 
15/12/2014 0.35 15/12/2025 5.7 
15/07/2015 0.10 15/12/2031 5.8 
15/07/2015 0.20 8/10/2029 6.0 
8/10/2015 0.30 8/10/2031 6.3 
*Weighted average maturity of loans: 14.9 years. 
Table A3. EFSF disbursements to Portugal 
Date of 
disbursement 
Amount disbursed 
(€bn) 
Maturity Cumulative amount 
disbursed (€bn) 
22/06/11 3.70 01/07/2036 3.70 
29/06/11 2.20 03/12/2025 5.90 
20/12/11 1.00 03/12/2025 6.90 
12/01/12 1.70 30/01/2035 8.60 
19/01/12 1.00 18/07/2027 9.60 
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30/05/12 3.50 30/05/2032 13.10 
30/05/12 1.70 30/05/2035 14.80 
17/07/12 1.50 17/07/2038 16.30 
17/07/12 1.10 17/07/2040 17.40 
03/12/12 0.80 03/12/2028 18.20 
07/02/13 0.80 07/02/2026 19.00 
27/06/13 1.05 27/06/2033 20.05 
27/06/13 1.05 27/06/2034 21.10 
22/11/13 3.70 22/11/2033 24.80 
28/04/14 1.20 28/04/2038 26.00 
Note: Weighted average maturity of loans: 20.8 years. 
Table A4. EFSF disbursements to Ireland 
Date of 
disbursement 
Amount disbursed 
(€bn) 
Maturity Cumulative amount 
disbursed (€bn) 
1/2/2011 1.9 1/8/2032 1.9 
1/2/2011 1.7 1/8/2033 3.6 
10/11/2011 0.9 1/8/2030 4.5 
10/11/2011 2.1 25/07/2031 6.6 
15/12/2011 1.0 1/8/2030 7.6 
12/1/2012 1.2 1/8/2029 8.8 
19/01/2012 0.5 1/7/2034 9.3 
3/4/2012 2.7 1/8/2031 12.0 
2/5/2013 0.8 1/8/2029 12.8 
18/06/2013 1.6 18/06/2042 14.4 
27/09/2013 1.0 27/09/2034 15.4 
4/12/2013 2.3 4/12/2033 17.7 
Note: Weighted average maturity: 20.8 years. 
Table A5. ESM disbursements to Spain (for banking sector recapitalisation) 
Date of 
disbursement 
Amount disbursed 
(€bn) 
Maturity Cumulative amount 
disbursed  (€bn)  
11/12/2012 39.468 11/12/2027  39.468 
5/2/2013 1.865 11/12/2022 41.333 
Note: Weighted average maturity: 12.5 years. 
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